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POLICY CHALLENGE
A defining characteristic of the banking, capital and labour markets is a high
degree of public intervention. These markets are all regulated, and have
implicit or explicit fiscal arrangements associated with them. Deepening
integration in these markets will likely therefore require governance inte-
gration, which might involve only the subset of EU countries that use the
euro. Since these countries constitute the EU majority, safeguards are
needed to protect the
legitimate single mar-
ket interests of the UK
and other euro-outs.
But the legitimate
interest of the euro-
area majority in deeper
market integration to
bolster the euro should
also be protected
against vetoes from
the euro-out minority.
Participation of euro and non-euro EU countries in inter-
governmental arrangements to strengthen EMU
THE ISSUE Access to the single market is one of the core benefits of the United
Kingdom’s membership of the European Union. A vote to leave the EU would
trigger difficult negotiations on continued access to that market. However, the
single market is not static. One of the drivers of change is the necessary
reforms to strengthen the euro. Such reforms would not only affect the euro’s
fiscal and political governance. They would also have an impact on the single
market, in particular in the areas of banking, capital markets and labour mar-
kets. This is bound to affect the UK, whether it remains in the EU or not.
Source: Bruegel. SRM = Single Resolution Mechanism.
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1. See Mourlon-Druol, E.
(2015) for a discussion
of the UK’s 1975 EU ref-
erendum and possible
lessons for today.
2. The title of a 1990
European Commission
publication that argued
that “one market needs
one money”. See Euro-
pean Commission
(1990).
3. These demands were
formulated against the
background of a com-
prehensive and
detailed examination of
the balance of compe-
tences between the UK
and the EU by the UK
civil service, which con-
cluded that, in most
areas and on most
issues, the balance is
about right. See HM
Government (2014).
IN THE LATE 1950s, many Euro-
pean countries shared the goal of
market integration but those able
to choose freely split into two
groups. Some, wishing for more
than market integration, joined
the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC): an ‘ever closer union’
with common institutions and
policies. Others, led by the
United Kingdom, joined the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association
(EFTA) and wished only for mar-
ket integration.
The UK joined the EEC in 1973
(and decided to remain in 1975)1
because it judged that staying
outside would hurt
its economic inter-
ests, not because of
a change of view on
the broader aims of
European Integra-
tion. Most other EFTA
members eventually
joined the EEC.
In the 1980s, the UK government
was one of the staunchest sup-
porters of the single market that
aimed to complete the common
market’s objective of free move-
ment of goods, persons, services
and capital. But in line with its
divided view on integration, the
UK rejected the ‘one market, one
money’2 logic advocated at the
time in support of a single cur-
rency, because it considered
that the single currency would
create common institutions and
policies amounting to a huge
step towards ‘ever closer union’.
Since the decisions were taken
to complete the single market
and create a monetary union,
there have been three major
developments in European eco-
nomic integration. First, the
single market has advanced but
is unfinished, with significant
remaining barriers to free move-
ment inside the EU. Second, the
euro was introduced but the orig-
inal design has proved fragile
and additional institutions and
policies have been introduced to
address the causes of the euro
crisis. The euro also remains an
unfinished construction. Third,
the EU has grown to 28 members,
with increased heterogeneity in
economic, social and political
conditions.
These developments
lie at the heart of UK
prime minister David
Cameron’s Novem-
ber 2015 letter to
European Council
president Donald
Tusk asking for “a
new settlement for
the United Kingdom in a
reformed European Union”
(Cameron, 2015). His four key
demands3 are:
• In order to improve competi-
tiveness, the EU should “do
more to fulfil its commitment
to the free flow of capital,
goods and services”, ie it
should complete the single
market.
• Regarding the other single
market area, the free flow of
persons, there should be lim-
its to social benefits in order to
“reduce the flow of people...
coming to Britain from the EU”,
a clear reference to the situa-
tion created by the EU
enlargements to low-income
countries from central and
eastern Europe.
• It is legitimate for euro mem-
bers to take the necessary
measures to sustain the mon-
etary union and it matters to
Britain that the project suc-
ceeds. “But we want to make
sure that these changes will
respect the integrity of the
single market, and the legiti-
mate interests of non-euro
members”.
• There should be a recognition
that the UK position in the EU
is special by ending “Britain’s
obligation to work towards an
‘ever closer union’”. 
They raise three questions: (1)
How can the single market be
deepened in line with this
vision? (2) How would meas-
ures to sustain the monetary
union affect the single market?
(3) How should the relationship
between euro and non-euro
countries be managed to ensure
the integrity of the single mar-
ket?
Irrespective of whether the UK
stays in the EU or leaves, these
questions must be tackled. In
particular, after an exit from the
EU, the UK would want to retain
access to the single market. The
exit negotiations would certainly
focus on that access and the
conditions attached. Changes to
the single market and its gover-
nance – for instance to
strengthen Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU) – would affect
‘Most UK demands
correspond to a
‘one market, two (or
several) monies’
vision of the EU.’
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4. For an early discus-
sion of differentiated
integration, see Stubb
(1996). 
all countries that are part of the
single market, whether they
belong to the EU or not. But they
will affect EU and non-EU coun-
tries differently in terms of
governance. For EU members,
the governance mechanisms
would be mostly based on the EU
treaties, but the UK outside
would have to rely on intergov-
ernmental agreements.
Finally, no federation or confed-
eration remains static in
governance terms. The EU will be
continuously subject to reforms
and changes. This complicates
the definition of the relationship
between the euro area and the
single market because the euro
area’s eventual shape is far from
being agreed. We consider likely
future developments in euro-
area governance and how their
impact on non-euro area and
non-EU countries can be man-
aged. As a blueprint for future
governance developments, we
use the Five Presidents’ Report
issued by European Commission
president Juncker (2015),
though we recognise that it
leaves many important ques-
tions unanswered.
THE SINGLE MARKET THEN AND
NOW
The common market and subse-
quently the single market have
been the cornerstones of Euro-
pean economic integration.
When the UK joined the EU, the
common market essentially
meant free movement of goods
and workers. In the former case,
tariffs and quotas had been elim-
inated but many non-tariff barri-
ers were still in place. But free
movement of goods also meant
common competition, trade and
agriculture policies. The UK had
to adopt these policies, despite
some reticence about loss of
sovereignty.
Free movement of workers had
also been technically achieved
by 1973 when the UK joined, but
did not translate into much
labour mobility between EU
countries. In addition to cultural
obstacles, economic and social
conditions were sufficiently sim-
ilar across EU countries to result
in little desire or necessity to
move.
The single market programme
that started in the mid-1980s
sought to remove hundreds of
remaining barriers to the free
movement of goods, persons,
services and capital. Non-tariff
barriers to goods were largely
eliminated as were capital con-
trols, resulting in substantial
capital movements. Further barri-
ers to the free mobility of workers
were also removed but intra-EU
migration flows remained low,
despite the accession in the
1980s of the lower-income coun-
tries Greece, Portugal and Spain.
The one area in which there was
little progress was services. The
Services Directive (2006/123/
EC) eventually took effect at the
end of 2009, but left many
remaining barriers because of
fears of unfair wage competition,
resulting from the accession of
ten lower-income central and
eastern European countries. In
addition, the Services Directive
did not cover regulated network
services, such as transportation,
telecommunications or energy.
For these activities, the creation
of a single market would require
a common EU philosophy about
regulation, if not the replacement
of national regulators by single
EU regulators.
A NOT-SO SINGLE MARKET
The EU is characterised by differ-
entiated levels of integration for
different countries and different
policy areas, but the UK stands
out as the most differentiated4.
The 1991 Maastricht treaty did
not affect the EU rules on free
movement of goods, persons,
services and capital, but it did
introduce a permanent deroga-
tion (‘opt-out’) from monetary
union for Denmark and the UK
and a temporary, but not time-
limited derogation to fulfil the
conditions to adopt the single
currency for all other EU coun-
tries.
The Maastricht treaty also intro-
duced differentiation in social
policy. The UK received an opt-
out from the social protocol
annexed to the treaty, though
this ended in 1997 when the UK
joined the other EU countries in
signing the Amsterdam treaty,
which incorporated the social
protocol in the EU treaty.
The Amsterdam treaty also incor-
porated the provisions of the
Schengen Agreement abolishing
border controls between EU
member states. From this, the UK
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and Ireland received both an opt-
out (a permanent derogation
from the Schengen rules) and an
opt-in (the possibility to partici-
pate in Schengen if participating
states agree)5. The Schengen
rules have clear implications for
the free movement of goods and
people, and are thus an element
of differentiation in the single
market.
ONE MARKET, ONE MONEY?
The predominant view in conti-
nental Europe at the time of
Maastricht was that the single
currency was the natural, per-
haps even indispensable,
complement to the single mar-
ket, because of the transaction
costs of different currencies
and/or because of the potential
political consequences for the
single market of competitive
devaluations6. Most British and
American econo-
mists, however,
considered that “the
economic justifica-
tion for [the one
market, one money]
view is dubious” or
even that it “has no
basis in either theory
or experience”7.
After the launch of the euro in
1999 and until the onset of the
euro-area crisis in 2010, the
sceptical view seemed to prevail
over the ‘one market, one money’
view. There were no complaints
by euro-area countries that non-
euro countries resorted to
competitive devaluations, and
there were no complaints in non-
euro countries that euro-area
countries benefitted from a com-
petitive advantage in the single
market because of the euro8.
Before the euro-area crisis,
therefore, there seemed to be no
problem in operating the single
market with multiple currencies.
Will euro-area reform change
the nature of the single mar-
ket?
The crisis demonstrated
painfully that the Maastricht sin-
gle currency setup was
incomplete. In response, various
governance reforms have been
made, within existing treaties
and through intergovernmental
agreements. These mainly con-
cern fiscal rules and have raised
important issues for the relation-
ship between euro-area and
non-euro area countries9. How-
ever, these governance changes
have only marginally impacted
the single market.
But the post-crisis
debate went further
and argued that a
‘genuine EMU’ needs,
as well as monetary
union, an economic
union, a banking
union, a fiscal union
and ultimately probably a politi-
cal union10. The Five Presidents’
Report makes concrete propos-
als on how to move forward, and
the banking union has been
already set in motion. These pro-
posals have direct implications
for the single market in terms of
banking, capital markets and
labour markets.
Banking
The only area of the single mar-
ket so far affected by the political
deepening of EMU is banking
markets. UK interests in this area
are obviously very important.
After the creation of the euro,
there was significant banking
integration through large whole-
sale banking flows within EMU.
However, the crisis led to a sub-
stantial re-fragmentation along
national lines (Sapir and Wolff,
2013). The integration of the
banking policy framework was a
direct response to the fragmen-
tation and the consequence of
monetary union that made a sin-
gle central bank the liquidity
provider to a banking system
with decentralised supervision.
A successful banking union
should eventually lead to a more
integrated euro-area banking
market, with fewer national
banks and greater cross-border
banking. But such a develop-
ment raises significant
questions for the single market
for banking, from both economic
and governance angles. Will
more-integrated euro-area banks
fragment the EU banking market
by deepening the separation
from non-euro area banking sys-
tems? How will new euro-area
institutions act? Will there be
new EU regulatory initiatives with
the primary aim to strengthen
the euro-area banking market?
The overall question that must be
addressed is how far such initia-
tives would be detrimental to the
single market for banking11.
‘The crisis demon-
strated painfully
that the Maas-
tricht single
currency setup
was incomplete.’
5. The other EU coun-
tries are obliged to
adopt the Schengen
rules but can obtain a
temporary, not time-
limited derogation to
fulfil the necessary
conditions.
6. See European Com-
mission (1990) for
description of the trans-
action cost argument
and Eichengreen
(1996) for the political
argument.
7. The first quote is
from Bean (1992); the
second is from Feld-
stein (1997).
8. Baldwin (2006)
found that the introduc-
tion of the euro had
very little trade impact
on participating coun-
tries and no detrimental
impact on trade
between these coun-
tries and those outside
the euro. More recent
studies confirm these
findings. See for exam-
ple Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2010).
9. For a detailed discus-
sion of the governance
challenges arising from
these reforms for the
relationship between
the euro area and the
non-euro area, see
Pisani-Ferry et al
(2012).
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
05
10.  This terminology is
used in the Van
Rompuy report (2012).
The Five Presidents’
Report endorses the
Van Rompuy report.
11. Certain tensions
have already appeared
over new euro-area gov-
ernance. For example,
there are different
views on certain
aspects of the Basel
regulatory framework.
12. For a detailed dis-
cussion, see Véron and
Wolff (2013).
13. Asdrubali et al
(1996) show empiri-
cally that capital
markets are the most
important shock
absorption mechanism
in existing monetary
unions.
14. Financial Stability,
Financial Services and
Capital Markets Union
Commissioner
Jonathan Hill (2015)
carefully avoided this
issue in proposing capi-
tal markets union.
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per se undermine the role of
financial centres outside the
area. However, for example, a
European regulation that limits
remuneration in the hedge-fund
industry or in the insurance sec-
tor, would affect the City of
London. Whether this happens or
not is largely a question of poli-
tics and governance and not of
the inherent eco-
nomic driving forces
of monetary union.
On the governance
side, a differentiation
is already becoming
visible. The Five Pres-
idents’ Report views
the integration of capital markets
as a priority for all EU countries
“but... particularly relevant to the
euro area” because EMU needs
to “strengthen private sector risk-
sharing across countries”13. This
could mean that euro-area coun-
tries should strive to use EU
single market rules to integrate
capital markets, but that in case
of insurmountable obstacles
they should not hesitate to use
other means, such as intergov-
ernmental agreements. The Five
Presidents’ Report even high-
lights the main likely obstacle
when it suggests that integrating
capital markets “should lead ulti-
mately to a single European
capital markets supervisor”. This
would likely be a red line for the
UK government14.
Labour markets
The Five Presidents’ Report
raises the possibility of differen-
tiating EU labour mobility. It calls
for a “push for a deeper integra-
tion of national labour markets
by facilitating geographic and
professional mobility, including
through better recognition of
qualifications, easier access to
public sector jobs for non-nation-
als and better coordination of
social security systems”. The
current refugee crisis is fast
changing the political dynamics
in this area.
One of the UK’s core demands is
to end equal social security treat-
ment. Other countries seem to be
somewhat open to this, partly
because of the increased hetero-
geneity of economic conditions
in the EU after enlargement. Obvi-
ously, welfare tourism should be
prevented, even though the evi-
dence is not strong that this is a
real problem (Giulietti, 2014).
The main issue is whether
unequal treatment of domestic
citizens and other EU nationals
would undermine the integrated
labour market. We would argue
that it would, because foreigners
would be disadvantaged in
labour market participation
terms relative to domestic citi-
zens. To maintain the integrity of
the single market for labour, the
challenge is to limit fraudulent
behaviour or welfare tourism,
while retaining the equal treat-
ment principle.
Introducing discrimination in the
treatment of domestic citizens
versus other EU nationals would
limit EU labour mobility, with neg-
ative effects for resource
allocation and EU growth
prospects. It would also most
likely require a revision of the EU
treaty, which would have to be
Capital markets
Capital markets union is a whole-
EU project that is being rolled-out
within the single market policy
framework12. Clearly, from an
economic point of view, capital
markets without the UK and the
City of London are inconceivable.
At the same time, the economic
rationale for deep-
ening cross-border
capital markets is
particularly strong in
the monetary union
in order to achieve
risk sharing (Bank of
England, 2015).
What would it take to achieve
greater capital markets integra-
tion, and to what extent is
political stability important for
financial integration? The euro in
its early phase boosted financial
integration across the euro area,
even though some of this led to
bubbles. But with the emergence
of political break-up risks, finan-
cial fragmentation increased
substantially at the height of the
crisis, only to reverse more
recently.
Beyond over-arching political
risks, regulatory harmonisation
(such as corporate insolvency,
taxation or financial product reg-
ulation) can increase
cross-border financial flows. The
question is then whether a sub-
set of EU countries or even the
euro area will advance without
the UK and to what extent that
would be an obstacle to the eco-
nomic development of the UK
and its financial system. Deeper
euro-area capital markets do not
‘Integrating capital
markets could
require a single
European capital
markets supervisor’
done in a way that left the equal
treatment principle untouched
for the euro area, where labour
mobility is essential on effi-
ciency grounds and as a shock
absorption mechanism.
In fact, the euro area needs more
cross-border labour mobility, not
less. This might require even
deeper integration of labour mar-
ket policies and the portability of
at least some welfare benefits
(Claeys et al, 2014). Differentia-
tion of labour market integration
could thus come both from the
side of (some) euro outsiders
and from euro area members.
Both would require treaty change.
HOW TO MANAGE FRICTIONS
BETWEEN DEEPER INTEGRA-
TION OF MONETARY UNION AND
THE SINGLE MARKET?
We have shown that there are
few if any genuine economic
forces arising from monetary
union that necessarily drive a
wedge between euro and non-
euro countries in the single
market. However,
monetary union
requires a deeper
level of economic
integration, in partic-
ular in banking,
financial markets and
labour markets15, a
defining feature of
which is that all are subject to
significant regulatory, supervi-
sory and even implicit and
explicit fiscal arrangements. The
agenda of deeper EU integration
will therefore entail various regu-
latory and institutional
approaches, as well as measures
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15.  Fiscal policy inte-
gration of the euro area
should also be consid-
ered in this context to
the extent that it is
important for the single
market.
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in pursuit of fiscal and political
integration.
By 2025, the time horizon for
completing EMU envisaged by
the Five Presidents’ Report, there
are two possible scenarios: one
in which the UK (if still an EU
member) is the only
country outside the
euro, and one in
which other coun-
tries have also not
joined the euro. The
UK certainly stands
out as the only coun-
try that has not
signed the three
post-crisis intergov-
e r n m e n t a l
agreements to strengthen EMU
(see the figure on the front
page). But that does not mean
that all the other countries will
join the monetary union in the
next decade. This will largely be a
political question, but a better
functioning EMU will surely
increase the pull of monetary
union.
The question of the
relationship between
the UK and Denmark
and the euro area is,
in a sense, the easi-
est one. Both have a
euro opt-out and
could not have antici-
pated that future
changes to the single market
would be needed to strengthen
EMU. It seems normal, therefore,
that the countries that now wish
to introduce such changes,
either through new EU rules or
through intergovernmental
agreements, ensure that they do
not negatively impact the perma-
nent opt-out countries.
Other EU countries agreed to join
the euro in due course when they
joined the EU. This puts a greater
onus on them to accept the
changes necessary to reinforce
EMU. However, it
would be fair that
they are fully associ-
ated with the reform
process in the euro
area, even while wait-
ing to join.
But it is not only the
countries currently
outside the euro that
need safeguards to
protect their legitimate single
market interests. The majority
also needs protection to ensure
that their legitimate efforts to
strengthen EMU, including where
necessary by deepening the sin-
gle market, will not be vetoed by
the non-euro minority. This boils
down to creating mechanisms to
protect both the minority against
the tyranny of the majority and
the majority against the tyranny
of the veto.
Agreement should be reached on
this within the existing treaty
framework. Giving the UK (and
other non-euro members) a veto
right would not be any more
appropriate than the euro coun-
tries having the right to disregard
the opinions of their non-euro
counterparts.   This mutual guar-
antee would have to apply to EU
laws as well as the actions of
existing institutions.
It is up to lawyers and politicians
‘Introducing
discrimination in
the treatment of
EU citizens would
limit EU labour
mobility.’
‘The minority
must be protected
against the
tyranny of the
majority, and the
majority against
the tyranny of the
veto.’
to find the best ways to achieve
this. Currently, there seem to be
adequate measures in place to
protect outsiders. For example,
the UK filed a complained against
the European Central Bank about
its treatment of clearing houses
and won the case before the
European Court of Justice (ECJ)16.
And the UK has won safeguards
in banking union matters through
the European Banking Authority.
Nevertheless, the
day-to-day gover-
nance of monetary
union currently takes
place largely inside
the Eurogroup, which
is causing friction. We
have argued else-
where that the relationship
between the ECOFIN council and
the Eurogroup should be re-
thought (Pisani-Ferry et al,
2012). For example, it would be a
strong symbol of good-will for
Eurogroup meetings to follow the
ECOFIN, instead of the other way
around, as currently.
However, as we have argued, the
fault-lines between the euro area
and the single market could
widen, which would require a
more robust arbitration mecha-
nism. Piris (2015) proposes to
entrust this to the ECJ, but there
could be other forums. David
Cameron’s proposal to give
national parliaments a veto right
is problematic, however, because
it would change the nature of the
union and potentially slow down
euro-area integration.
Arbitration would hardly solve
the deeper issues, however. In
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the three single market areas we
have discussed, we see at least
some situations in which the cur-
rent EU treaty would not provide
adequate safeguards. This con-
cerns both the deepening of the
euro area and the stepping back
of the UK from some already-
undertaken integration steps,
most notably in migration.
In terms of deeper euro-area
integration, one could
imagine further inter-
g o v e r n m e n t a l
agreements or even a
new euro-area treaty.
The question then is
what legal safe-
guards could be put
in place to prevent
such a euro-area treaty from
unduly damaging the UK’s sin-
gle-market interests.
As far as situations in which the
UK might wish to opt out of EU
legislation relating to labour
mobility are concerned, and
especially if the UK decided to
leave the EU, we would imagine it
to be possible that a
new legal status for
the UK could be nego-
tiated17. This status
could give access to
the single market for
goods but be much
more restrictive for
labour mobility. How-
ever, access to the
single market for (financial) serv-
ices would be a core issue of the
negotiations and would most cer-
tainly be used as a bargaining
chip to limit the reduction in
labour mobility18.
In conclusion, having the euro
and other currencies has not
undermined the single market so
far. But there could be attempts
to deepen the single market in
the euro area in order to increase
its resilience, which will create a
need for new regulations, new or
strengthened institutions and,
ultimately, greater democratic
legitimacy mechanisms. These
developments could, but would
not necessarily, affect the func-
tioning of the EU single market.
Soon rather than later, the euro-
area majority, and the UK (and
other outs) must agree on how to
protect their respective interests.
Without such agreements, signif-
icant economic conflicts could
emerge from governance deci-
sions and policy divergence in a
deepening single market in the
euro area. This would be damag-
ing for all EU countries.
Finally, a UK exit from the EU
would not make the potential
problems we have discussed dis-
appear. Geography dictates that
the UK’s relationship with the EU
single market would
remain paramount.
With respect to its par-
ticipation in the single
market, all that the UK
would achieve by
leaving the EU would
be to weaken its posi-
tion to influence
European regulations,
institutions and politics.
We thank colleagues, as well as Ian
Harden and Helen Wallace, and a
number of policymakers, for their
comments on earlier drafts of this
paper. Remaining errors are our
own.
‘Day-to-day gover-
nance of monetary
union takes place
largely inside the
Eurogroup, which
is causing friction.’
16. Case T-496/11
United Kingdom v Euro-
pean Central Bank.
17. We accept the argu-
ment of Piris (2016)
that such a status is
legally difficult to
achieve. We are less
sure about his assess-
ment about the UK’s
comparatively weak
negotiating position.
18. Such a special
treaty would put the UK
outside of the EU and
would obviously fulfil
David Cameron’s
demand to end the UK’s
commitment to an ever-
closer union. The
special status could
emerge as a possible
alternative to EU mem-
bership for other
countries such as
Turkey, with which the
EU may want to inten-
sify the economic
relationship without
committing to free
labour mobility.
‘A UK exit from
the EU would not
make the poten-
tial problems we
have discussed
disappear.’
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